Putnam the logic of two level games summary

Putnam, , Schimmelfennig, , cf. Key to Putnam's approach is the consideration that negotiators not only have to take care of their counterparts in the international arena, but also have to keep their national constituents in mind.

Putnam, , Schimmelfennig, f. Ratification of a tentative agreement at Level II can happen formally or informally. Formal ratification could be a parliamentary vote required by the constitution.

Informal ratification may be any consequences a government has to expect at home, be it pressure by economic lobbies or a change in public opinion. Putnam, ff. The domestic level may - formally or informally - only ratify certain agreements. The amount of all agreements that would possibly find the acceptance of Level II Putnam calls win-sets. This means, successful implementation of an agreement is only possible when the countries' win-sets overlap. However, a big win-set is not necessarily a bargaining advantage.

Schelling I, Putnam ff. Constituents might have different opinions about e. Interest assessment becomes even more complex with issue linkages, which shall be in special focus later on. Putnam fif. Secondly, the institutions at the domestic level shape the country's win-set. Also, the higher the power concentration, like in an autocratic state, the greater the win-set.

Governments of liberal democratic countries, which are very reliant on their constituency, thus face smallerwin-sets. Putnam ff. Lastly, the negotiator's strategies influence the size of the win-set. In other words, final ratification must simply be 2 Investigators in other fields have recently proposed models of linked games, analogous in some respects to this model I enzau, Riker and Shepsle, ; Rogoff, ; Tsebelis, ; Scharpf, ; All and Eichengreen, forthcoming.

First, larger win-sets generally make Level I agreement more like. By definition, agreement is possible only if the win-sets of the organizations overlap, and the larger each win-set, the more likely they are to overlap. Second, the relative size of the Level II win-sets will affect the distribution of the gains from the Level I bargain.

The larger the perceived win-set of the negotiator, the more he-can be "pushed around" by the other Level I negotiators. Conversely, a small domestic win-set can be a bargaining advantage: "I'd like to accept your proposal, but they would never accept it back home. The win-set depends on the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level II constituents.

In some cases, evaluation of no-agreement may be the only significant disagreement among the Level II constituents, because their interests are relatively homogeneous. An arms negotiator is unlikely to face criticism at home because a proposed agreement reduces the opponents' weaponry too much. In other cases, by contrast, constituents' preferences are more heterogeneous. In , some Americans opposed the Versailles Treaty because it was too harsh on the defeated powers, others because it was too lenient.

The strategic problems facing Level I negotiators dealing with a homogeneous conflict are quite different from those facing negotiators dealing with a heterogeneous conflict. In some cases, lines of cleavage within the Level II constituencies will cut across the Level I division, and the Level I negotiator may find silent allies at his opponent's domestic table.

When the negotiation involves more than one issue, various groups at Level II are likely to have different preferences on the several issues, and the chief negotiator is faced with trade-offs across different issues: how much to yield on citrus exports to get a better deal on microchips, and so on.

In certain cases, synergistic linkage in the international negotiations facilitates policy choices that would otherwise be unacceptable domestically. Economic interdependence multiplies the opportunities for altering domes- tic coalitions and thus policy outcomes by creating political entanglements across national boundaries.

The win-set depends on Level II political institutions. Ratification procedures affect the size of the win-set. For example, the U. This increases the bargain- ing power of American and Japanese negotiators, but it also reduces the scope for international cooperation. Cetens parties, the more autonomous a state is from domestic pressures, the weaker its negotiating position internationally but the greater its scope for international cooperation. The win-set depends on the strategies of the Level I negotiators.

Each negotiator has an unequivocal interest in maximizing the other side's win-set, but his motives are mixed with respect to his own win-set.

Thus, a utility-maximizing negotiator must seek to convince his opposite number that his own win-set is "kinly," that is, that the deal he proposes is certain to be ratified, but that any deal even slightly more favorable to the opponent is unlikely to be ratified.

If a negotiator wishes to expand his win-set in order to facilitate ratification, he may exploit both domestic and international side payments.

An experienced negotiator familiar with the respective domestic tables should be able to maximize the cost-effectiveness of the concessions that he must make to ensure ratification abroad, as well as the cost-effectiveness of his own demands and threats, by targeting his initiatives with an eye to their Level II incidence, both at home and abroad. A rational Soviet arms negotiator should target his threats and his offers neither at the hawks nor at the doves in Congress, but at the "persuadable skeptics" in the middle, while paying special attention to the views of the "swing voters" back home in the Kremlin.

Level I negotiators are often misinformed about Level II politics, particularly on the opposing side. Uncertainty about the win-set can be both a bargaining device and a stumbling block in two- level negotiation. In purely distributive terms, negotiators have an incentive to understate their own win-sets, but uncertainty about the opponent's win- set increases one's concern about the risk of failed ratification.

Much of what happens in any bargaining situation involves attempts by the players to alter one another's perceptions of the costs of no-agreement and the benefits of proposed agreements. In two-level games, governments gener- ally seek to expand one another's win-sets. Form new words as in A above. In addition, form a third word by adding a letter at the beginning and the end of the word.

Member, National Academy of Sciences, — Corresponding [i. Since Putnam suggested the theory of two-level games, many analysts have tried to apply it to international negotiations at the bilateral level. In this guide to Pillars of Eternity, you can find all the information allowing you to complete all the missions — both main and side — without any problems. However, you can place even bets, in any amount, on each game individually. What is your strategy for placing bets on the individual games in order to achieve the cumulative result The city as a whole, and the Jewish community in particular, are overwhelmingly opposed to the GOP, its immigration policies, its antisemitism, and Donald Trump in particular.

Putnam RD. International Organization [Internet]. Skip to main content. To keep up with his events and travel, please continue to visit this website. He has received numerous scholarly honors, including Ethnic diversity is increasing in most advanced countries, driven mostly by sharp increases in immigration. In the long run immigration and diversity are likely to have important cultural, economic, fiscal, and developmental benefits.

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